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and children.
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  Abstract	  	  
The	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  claims	  that	  reasoning	  evolved	  for	  argumentation:	  to	  find	  and	  evaluate	  arguments	  in	  dialogic	  contexts.	  The	  theory	  has	  drawn	  most	  of	  its	  supportive	  evidence	  from	  work	  with	  adults,	  leaving	  open	  the	  possibility	  that	  reasoning’s	  argumentive	  features	  are	  in	  fact	  purely	  learnt.	  In	  this	  article	  evidence	  is	  reviewed	  suggesting	  that	  there	  is	  a	  special	  relation	  between	  reasoning	  and	  argumentation	  as	  soon	  as	  children	  start	  to	  reason.	  More	  specifically,	  it	  will	  be	  argued	  (i)	  that	  children	  possess	  basic	  argument	  skills,	  (ii)	  that	  they	  are	  able	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  group	  reasoning	  from	  very	  early	  on,	  (iii)	  that	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  present	  as	  soon	  as	  they	  start	  to	  argue	  and,	  (iv)	  that	  children	  can	  be	  victims	  of	  the	  same	  biases	  that	  affect	  adults	  when	  they	  use	  reasoning	  in	  the	  wrong	  contexts.	  These	  results	  strengthen	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning,	  and	  support	  a	  plea	  for	  more	  research	  on	  the	  interactive	  features	  of	  reasoning	  both	  in	  adults	  and	  children.	  
	  




“The	  social	  need	  to	  share	  the	  thought	  of	  others	  and	  to	  communicate	  our	  own	  with	  success	  is	  at	  the	  root	  of	  our	  need	  for	  verification.	  Logical	  reasoning	  is	  an	  argument	  which	  we	  have	  with	  ourselves,	  and	  which	  reproduces	  internally	  the	  features	  of	  a	  real	  argument.”	  
	  (Piaget,	  1928,	  p.	  204)	  
There	  is	  an	  old	  tension	  in	  philosophy	  and	  psychology	  between	  individual	  and	  social	  views	  of	  intelligence.	  In	  modern	  psychology	  it	  seems	  as	  if	  the	  individual	  view	  has	  become	  dominant,	  at	  least	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  methods	  used	  to	  investigate	  intelligence.	  Participants	  are	  asked	  to	  solve	  problems,	  to	  make	  decisions,	  to	  evaluate	  logical	  arguments,	  more	  often	  than	  not	  in	  isolation.	  Reasoning	  in	  particular	  is	  supposed	  to	  help	  the	  individual	  overcome	  her	  faulty	  intuitions	  (Kahneman,	  2003)	  and	  solve	  novel	  problems	  (Evans	  &	  Over,	  1996;	  Stanovich,	  2004),	  without	  inputs	  from	  the	  social	  world	  playing	  any	  particular	  role.	  Room	  is	  often	  made	  for	  social	  intelligence,	  but	  it	  is	  generally	  seen	  as	  a	  distinct	  set	  of	  faculties,	  comprising	  for	  instance,	  perspective	  taking,	  theory	  of	  mind	  and	  empathy	  (Goleman,	  2006).	  	  
At	  least	  since	  the	  ancient	  Greeks,	  voices	  have	  raised	  the	  possibility	  that	  intelligence	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  reasoning	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  profoundly	  social	  ability	  (see	  Billig,	  1996).	  Over	  the	  last	  century,	  the	  most	  illustrious	  of	  these	  voices	  have	  come	  from	  developmental	  psychology.	  Baldwin	  saw	  “no	  invention	  without	  some	  social	  reference”	  (1906,	  p.	  288).	  Vygosty	  stated	  that	  “every	  function	  in	  the	  child’s	  cultural	  development	  appears	  twice:	  first,	  on	  the	  social	  level,	  and	  later,	  on	  the	  individual	  level.”	  (1978,	  p.	  57).	  And	  Piaget	  believed	  that	  “social	  interaction	  is	  a	  necessary	  condition	  of	  the	  development	  of	  logic”	  (1976,	  p.	  80;	  quoted	  and	  translated	  in	  Doise	  &	  Mugny,	  1984,	  p.	  19).	  Despite	  these	  pleas	  to	  take	  into	  account	  the	  social	  dimension	  of	  reasoning,	  developmental	  research	  on	  reasoning	  still	  often	  assumes	  that	  its	  object	  of	  study	  is	  mostly	  an	  individual	  ability,	  even	  if	  one	  that	  can	  also	  be	  put	  to	  use	  in	  social	  contexts.	  
	   In	  adult	  psychology	  as	  well	  some	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  reasoning	  might	  be	  a	  social	  trait.	  Billig	  has	  emphasized	  the	  role	  of	  rhetoric	  and	  persuasion	  in	  social	  psychology	  (Billig,	  1996).	  Graff	  has	  insisted	  on	  the	  importance	  of	  engaging	  students	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through	  teaching	  debates	  and	  controversies	  (Graff,	  1993).	  Moral	  psychologists	  (Bloom,	  2010;	  Haidt	  &	  F.	  Bjorklund,	  2007)	  and	  philosophers	  (Gibbard,	  1990)	  have	  pointed	  out	  the	  importance	  of	  argumentation	  and	  debates	  for	  moral	  reasoning.	  Still	  reasoning	  is	  considered	  by	  most	  to	  be	  an	  individual	  skill	  (Evans	  &	  Over,	  1996;	  Kahneman,	  2003;	  Stanovich,	  2004).	  
	   The	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  is	  a	  recent	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  reasoning	  is	  a	  fundamentally	  social	  ability	  (Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press-­‐a).	  It	  claims	  that	  reasoning	  has	  evolved	  to	  serve	  argumentive	  ends:	  finding	  and	  evaluating	  arguments	  in	  a	  dialogic	  context.	  In	  the	  following	  section,	  the	  theory	  and	  the	  main	  arguments	  supporting	  it	  are	  briefly	  reviewed.	  This	  section	  also	  articulates	  more	  precisely	  the	  role	  of	  developmental	  evidence	  for	  such	  an	  evolutionary	  theory	  and	  specifies	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  current	  article.	  Sections	  2,	  3	  and	  4	  are	  dedicated	  to	  a	  review	  of	  evidence	  showing	  that	  reasoning	  is	  for	  argumentation	  in	  children	  as	  it	  is	  in	  adults.	  	  
1.	  The	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  
1.1	  Intuitive	  and	  reflective	  inference	  
Dual	  process	  theories	  have	  become	  the	  dominant	  framework	  in	  the	  psychology	  of	  reasoning	  (for	  work	  on	  adults,	  see	  Evans,	  2008,	  and	  for	  developmental	  work,	  see	  Klaczynski,	  2009,	  Reyna	  &	  Brainerd,	  1995).	  In	  spite	  of	  this	  convergence	  there	  is	  still	  a	  great	  deal	  of	  vagueness	  in	  the	  characterizations	  of	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  processes.	  Mercier	  and	  Sperber	  have	  attempted	  to	  sharpen	  the	  distinction	  by	  defining	  and	  contrasting	  
intuitive	  and	  reflective	  inferences	  (Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  2009).	  Inference	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  here	  in	  its	  more	  general	  meaning	  of	  a	  psychological	  process	  that	  takes	  an	  input,	  processes	  it,	  and	  delivers	  an	  enriched	  output.	  Inferences	  are	  the	  usual	  stuff	  of	  cognition,	  from	  perception	  all	  the	  way	  to	  higher	  processes	  such	  as	  reasoning.	  In	  intuitive	  inferences,	  no	  attention	  is	  paid	  to	  the	  reasons	  for	  which	  the	  inference	  is	  drawn.	  When	  Peter	  enters	  a	  subway	  station	  and	  sees	  people	  on	  the	  platform,	  he	  infers	  that	  they	  are	  waiting	  for	  the	  train.	  This	  inference	  is	  spontaneous;	  he	  does	  not	  realize	  that	  its	  output	  was	  delivered	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  certain	  input	  related	  to	  the	  present	  situation	  and	  to	  his	  general	  knowledge	  about	  people’s	  behavior.	  Intuitive	  inferences	  can	  be	  very	  rich	  and	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sophisticated,	  but	  people	  are	  not	  normally	  aware	  of	  the	  reasons	  that	  justify	  their	  drawing	  them.	  	  
In	  reflective	  inferences,	  by	  contrast,	  reasons	  for	  drawing	  a	  conclusion	  are	  pondered.	  Among	  the	  people	  on	  the	  platform	  is	  a	  man	  with	  a	  security	  uniform.	  Is	  he	  simply	  waiting	  for	  the	  train,	  or	  is	  he	  watching	  over	  this	  area?	  Peter	  can	  start	  thinking	  about	  this,	  reflecting	  upon	  the	  evidence	  for	  the	  two	  hypotheses.	  The	  uniform	  supports	  the	  latter	  hypothesis,	  but	  his	  behavior	  is	  inconsistent	  with	  that	  conclusion:	  he	  is	  sitting,	  not	  paying	  particular	  attention	  to	  his	  surroundings.	  So,	  perhaps	  he	  is	  just	  taking	  a	  break	  but	  still	  not	  waiting	  for	  the	  train.	  	  Peter	  decides	  that	  the	  evidence	  is	  inconclusive	  and	  waits	  to	  observe	  his	  behavior	  as	  the	  train	  approaches.	  In	  this	  case,	  Peter	  can	  easily	  state	  the	  reasons	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  which	  he	  drew	  a	  given	  conclusion.	  Reflective	  inferences	  are	  concerned	  with	  such	  evidential	  or	  logical	  relationships	  among	  representations:	  is	  a	  given	  representation	  (the	  premise)	  a	  good	  reason	  to	  accept	  another	  representation	  (the	  conclusion)?	  In	  the	  remainder	  of	  this	  article	  reasoning	  refers	  only	  to	  this	  very	  specific	  type	  of	  inference	  while	  intuition	  is	  used	  for	  intuitive	  inferences	  generally.	  
1.2	  The	  argumentative	  function	  of	  reasoning	  
Why	  are	  humans,	  alone	  in	  the	  animal	  kingdom,	  able	  to	  reason?	  Dual	  process	  theories	  often	  point	  to	  reasoning’s	  epistemic	  and	  practical	  advantages.	  	  Reasoning	  should	  help	  us	  create	  new	  beliefs,	  generate	  knowledge,	  and	  drive	  us	  towards	  better	  decisions.	  Appealing	  as	  this	  view	  may	  be,	  it	  faces	  significant	  problems	  that	  can	  only	  be	  briefly	  summarized	  here	  (but	  see	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  2009).	  The	  first	  problem	  is	  that,	  on	  the	  one	  hand,	  intuitions	  are	  very	  powerful	  and	  successfully	  guide	  most	  of	  our	  inferences	  and	  decisions	  while,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  reasoning	  is	  slow	  and	  costly.	  The	  second	  and	  more	  serious	  problem	  is	  that	  reasoning	  is	  itself	  far	  from	  being	  foolproof,	  with	  educated	  adults	  being	  confused	  by	  simple	  logical	  problems	  (Evans,	  2002)	  and	  reasoning	  being	  the	  cause	  of	  many	  a	  poor	  decision	  (Kunda,	  1990;	  Shafir,	  Simonson,	  &	  Tversky,	  1993).	  If	  intuitions	  bring,	  overall,	  good	  outcomes,	  while	  reasoning	  is	  not	  very	  efficient	  at	  correcting	  flawed	  intuitions,	  it	  should	  lead	  us	  to	  question	  the	  idea	  that	  reasoning	  evolved	  to	  that	  end.	  
	   In	  contrast	  to	  the	  view	  of	  reasoning	  as	  a	  tool	  of	  individual	  cognition,	  Sperber	  has	  suggested	  that	  it	  may	  have	  evolved	  mainly	  for	  argumentative	  purposes	  (Sperber,	  2001).	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The	  evolutionary	  argument	  can	  only	  be	  sketched	  here	  (see	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press-­‐a).	  Humans	  rely	  on	  communication	  to	  an	  unprecedented	  extent	  within	  the	  Primate	  order.	  Communication,	  however,	  is	  hard	  to	  maintain	  evolutionarily:	  senders	  usually	  have	  incentives	  to	  lie,	  deceive	  and	  manipulate	  receivers.	  If	  receivers	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  communication,	  they	  stop	  receiving,	  thereby	  threatening	  the	  stability	  of	  communication.	  So	  receivers	  evolve	  mechanisms	  of	  epistemic	  vigilance	  that	  allow	  them	  to	  accept	  information	  discriminately	  (Sperber	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  One	  of	  the	  means	  that	  can	  be	  used	  is	  to	  exchange	  arguments.	  Senders	  provide	  reasons	  supporting	  their	  claims,	  and	  receivers	  can	  evaluate	  these	  reasons.	  Arguments	  allow	  for	  more	  efficient	  communication:	  claims	  that	  would	  otherwise	  have	  been	  automatically	  rejected	  can	  now	  be	  defended	  and	  properly	  evaluated.	  While	  some	  are	  still	  rejected,	  others	  are	  found	  to	  be	  well	  supported	  and	  accepted.	  Therefore,	  both	  senders	  and	  receivers	  benefit	  from	  the	  exchange	  of	  reasons:	  senders	  get	  more	  messages	  across,	  and	  receivers	  have	  a	  finer-­‐grained	  mechanism	  to	  evaluate	  communicated	  information.	  In	  this	  view,	  reasoning	  is	  the	  cognitive	  ability	  that	  evolved	  in	  order	  to	  help	  senders	  find	  reasons	  and	  receivers	  evaluate	  them.	  This	  makes	  of	  reasoning	  a	  fundamentally	  argumentative,	  social	  device.	  Even	  though	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  that	  reasoning	  evolved	  mostly	  to	  serve	  argumentative	  purposes,	  it	  is	  always	  possible	  that	  it	  also	  evolved	  or	  was	  co-­‐opted	  for	  other	  ends.	  Accordingly,	  argumentation	  will	  be	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  ‘main’	  function	  of	  reasoning.	  
	   Evolutionary	  stories	  are	  bound	  to	  remain	  speculative	  and	  incomplete.	  Yet	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  an	  array	  of	  evidence	  to	  defend	  their	  plausibility	  and	  test	  them	  again	  competing	  hypotheses.	  A	  fit	  between	  structure	  and	  function	  should	  be	  expected	  for	  any	  evolved	  mechanism—including	  cognitive	  devices.	  Thus,	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  use	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  to	  make	  predictions	  about	  the	  way	  reasoning	  should	  work,	  predictions	  that	  can	  be	  tested	  through	  experimental	  psychology	  on	  modern	  human	  participants.	  The	  main	  predictions	  are	  the	  following	  (see	  Mercier,	  in	  press-­‐a,	  in	  press-­‐b;	  Mercier,	  submitted-­‐a,	  submitted-­‐b,	  Mercier	  &	  Landemore,	  in	  press;	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press-­‐a;	  Sperber	  &	  Mercier,	  in	  press,	  for	  elaboration	  and	  references):	  
-­‐ If	  reasoning	  evolved	  to	  find	  and	  evaluate	  arguments,	  the	  most	  straightforward	  prediction	  is	  that	  people	  should	  be	  able	  to	  accomplish	  these	  tasks	  well	  enough—at	  least	  in	  the	  contexts	  in	  which	  reasoning	  evolved	  to	  work,	  namely	  when	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participants	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  discussion.	  There	  is	  good	  evidence	  that	  adults	  exhibit	  good	  informal	  argumentive	  skills;	  	  they	  can	  discern	  good	  from	  bad	  arguments,	  spot	  fallacies,	  create	  complex	  arguments	  and	  follow	  commitments	  and	  burdens	  of	  proof.	  
-­‐ A	  second	  straightforward	  prediction	  is	  that	  reasoning	  should	  be	  more	  efficient	  in	  argumentive	  contexts,	  much	  like	  our	  breathing	  apparatus	  functions	  better	  under	  the	  conditions	  in	  which	  it	  evolved,	  as	  opposed	  to,	  say,	  water	  or	  high	  altitude.	  This	  is	  indeed	  the	  case.	  When	  participants	  are	  motivated	  to	  create	  arguments,	  they	  have	  recourse	  to	  logical	  structures,	  such	  as	  modus	  tollens	  that	  are	  deeply	  problematic	  in	  non-­‐dialogic	  contexts.	  When	  they	  have	  to	  discuss	  a	  task	  as	  a	  group,	  participants	  reach	  very	  good	  results	  on	  the	  same	  tasks	  at	  which	  they	  fail	  abysmally	  when	  reasoning	  on	  their	  own.	  	  
-­‐ When	  we	  are	  engaged	  in	  a	  discussion,	  we	  mostly	  want	  arguments	  for	  our	  side	  or	  against	  the	  position	  of	  our	  interlocutor.	  Thus,	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  predicts	  that	  a	  bias	  towards	  this	  type	  of	  arguments	  should	  be	  a	  feature	  of	  reasoning	  when	  it	  produces	  arguments.	  And	  indeed	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  prevalent	  and	  robust	  biases	  observed	  in	  reasoning.	  	  
-­‐ When	  people	  reason	  about	  a	  decision	  they	  have	  already	  made	  or	  a	  conclusion	  they	  have	  already	  reached,	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  should	  lead	  to	  motivated	  reasoning	  and,	  in	  turn,	  to	  epistemically,	  practically	  or	  morally	  dubious	  outcomes.	  
-­‐ Finally,	  when	  reasoning	  is	  used	  in	  decision	  making,	  it	  should	  lead	  people	  towards	  decisions	  that	  are	  easy	  to	  justify—decisions	  for	  which	  they	  can	  find	  reasons—rather	  than	  good	  decisions.	  Sometimes,	  these	  easy	  to	  justify	  decisions	  will	  not	  be	  the	  best	  decisions.	  	  
1.3	  The	  role	  of	  developmental	  evidence	  
A	  large	  amount	  of	  evidence	  supports	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning.	  However,	  all	  the	  evidence	  reviewed	  in	  previous	  articles	  comes	  from	  work	  with	  adult	  participants.	  Given	  that	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  is	  at	  heart	  an	  evolutionary	  theory,	  it	  is	  crucial	  to	  show	  that	  the	  features	  it	  predicts	  do	  not	  simply	  result	  from	  a	  pure	  learning	  process.	  One	  can	  clearly	  not	  conclude	  from	  undergraduates’	  reading	  skills	  that	  reading	  is	  an	  evolved	  ability.	  Could	  the	  features	  listed	  above	  be	  learnt?	  Children	  could	  learn	  to	  put	  their	  reasoning	  skills	  to	  use	  in	  argumentation	  long	  after	  these	  skills	  have	  developed.	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Reasoning	  could	  be	  more	  efficient	  in	  group	  because	  adults	  are	  simply	  more	  used	  to	  working	  in	  groups.	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  could	  emerge	  when	  children	  realize	  that	  they	  win	  more	  arguments	  when	  they	  only	  use	  arguments	  supporting	  their	  side.	  The	  negative	  side	  effects	  of	  reasoning	  could	  then	  result	  from	  the	  misuse	  of	  reasoning	  skills	  that	  were	  not	  designed	  to	  argue	  in	  the	  first	  place.	  It	  is	  therefore	  crucial	  to	  show	  that	  all	  of	  these	  features	  of	  reasoning	  are	  not	  purely	  the	  result	  of	  a	  learning	  process.	  A	  way	  of	  doing	  so	  is	  to	  look	  for	  evidence	  in	  children.	  If	  all	  the	  features	  of	  reasoning	  listed	  are	  present	  in	  children,	  and	  do	  not	  seem	  to	  develop	  out	  of	  individual	  abilities,	  then	  a	  substantial	  hole	  in	  the	  evidence	  supporting	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  will	  be	  filled.	  
	   While	  a	  broad	  range	  of	  evidence	  is	  reviewed,	  the	  scope	  of	  the	  article	  is	  limited	  and	  focused	  on	  furthering	  an	  evolutionary,	  or	  ultimate	  theory	  of	  reasoning.	  Tinbergen	  famously	  described	  4	  levels	  of	  analysis	  that	  can	  be	  used	  when	  investigating	  biological	  phenomena	  (Tinbergen,	  1963).	  The	  ultimate	  level	  bears	  on	  the	  function	  of	  a	  biological	  structure:	  why	  did	  it	  evolve,	  what	  is	  it	  adapted	  for.	  Phylogenetic	  level	  enquiries	  deal	  with	  evolutionary	  history	  of	  a	  trait:	  when	  did	  it	  evolve,	  what	  are	  its	  antecedents.	  The	  proximal	  level	  is	  that	  of	  mechanisms:	  how	  does	  the	  structure	  work.	  Finally,	  the	  developmental	  level	  explains	  how	  the	  structure	  comes	  to	  reach	  its	  shape	  during	  development.	  These	  levels	  of	  analysis	  are	  not	  competitors,	  they	  are	  complementary	  (for	  an	  example	  of	  integration,	  see	  D.	  F.	  Bjorklund	  &	  Pellegrini,	  2002).	  
	   When	  it	  comes	  to	  recently	  evolved	  human	  traits,	  phylogenetic	  evidence	  is	  likely	  to	  remain	  scant,	  and	  hypotheses	  tentative.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  proximal	  and	  developmental	  theories	  have	  been	  the	  focus	  of	  nearly	  all	  the	  research	  in	  psychology,	  and	  the	  domain	  of	  reasoning	  is	  no	  exception.	  Rich	  theories	  detailing	  the	  working	  and	  development	  of	  reasoning	  have	  been	  put	  forward,	  and	  these	  theories	  have	  consequences	  not	  only	  for	  one	  another	  but	  also	  for	  ultimate	  level	  theories.	  The	  present	  focus	  on	  an	  ultimate	  level	  analysis	  in	  no	  way	  entails	  that	  the	  other	  levels	  are	  any	  less	  important,	  or	  that	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  cannot	  make	  predictions	  for	  other	  levels.	  	  
Importantly,	  a	  focus	  on	  the	  ultimate	  level	  of	  analysis	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  the	  role	  of	  development	  should	  be	  downplayed	  (see	  Kuhn,	  in	  press,	  and,	  for	  a	  reply,	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press	  b).	  Claiming	  that	  a	  mechanism	  is	  an	  adaptation	  does	  not	  mean	  that	  no	  development	  is	  necessary.	  Language	  offers	  a	  good	  example:	  is	  it	  perfectly	  possible	  to	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think	  that	  language	  is	  an	  adaptation	  without	  denying	  that	  it	  needs	  to	  develop	  and	  that	  a	  lot	  of	  learning	  goes	  on	  throughout	  this	  developmental	  process.	  The	  same	  goes	  on	  for	  reasoning	  and	  argumentation.	  The	  view	  defended	  here	  is	  that	  reasoning	  is	  an	  adaptation	  for	  argumentation	  but	  that	  it	  still	  needs	  to	  develop	  to	  reach	  a	  stage	  of	  adult	  competency.	  	  	  
	   As	  a	  result,	  the	  present	  article	  focuses	  on	  showing	  that	  reasoning	  in	  children	  already	  bears	  the	  mark	  of	  its	  argumentative	  function,	  a	  crucial	  piece	  of	  evidence	  for	  the	  argumentative	  theory.	  The	  predictions	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  are	  evaluated	  in	  the	  order	  in	  which	  they	  have	  been	  listed	  above.	  Section	  2	  defends	  children’s	  argumentive	  skills,	  demonstrating	  that	  children	  possess	  argumentative	  skills	  from	  very	  early	  on.	  These	  argumentive	  skills	  bring	  the	  most	  benefits	  when	  children	  reason	  and	  solve	  problems	  in	  group,	  as	  shown	  in	  Section	  3.	  For	  reasoning	  to	  best	  serve	  argumentative	  purpose,	  it	  should	  produce	  arguments	  following	  a	  confirmation	  bias.	  Section	  4	  reviews	  evidence	  of	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  starting	  as	  early	  as	  children	  start	  to	  reason	  and	  argue.	  It	  also	  covers	  other	  reasoning	  biases	  explained	  by	  the	  argumentative	  account.	  
2.	  Children’s	  argumentive	  skills	  
The	  first	  and	  most	  straightforward	  prediction	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  that	  people	  should	  have	  enough	  argumentive skills	  to	  be	  able	  to	  take	  part	  in	  informal	  arguments.	  Moreover,	  children	  should	  not	  have	  to	  learn	  argumentive skills	  entirely,	  and	  some	  of	  these	  skills	  should	  develop	  at	  least	  as	  early	  as	  other	  reasoning	  abilities.	  
	   In	  order	  to	  engage	  in	  informal	  arguments	  only	  relatively	  basic	  argumentive	  skills	  are	  required.	  People	  must	  be	  able	  to	  construct	  and	  evaluate	  simple	  arguments	  and	  not	  to	  build	  the	  complex	  and	  lengthy	  arguments	  found	  in	  books	  or	  essays.	  They	  do	  not	  have	  to	  recognize	  argument	  forms	  or	  to	  draw	  argument	  schemas—as	  language	  users	  do	  not	  need	  to	  be	  able	  to	  explicitly	  recognize	  what	  a	  subject	  is	  or	  to	  draw	  syntactic	  trees.	  The	  minimal	  skills	  that	  are	  predicted	  to	  be	  present	  in	  children	  and	  adults	  are	  therefore	  likely	  to	  leave	  many	  unsatisfied.	  They	  are	  certainly	  not	  sufficient	  to	  make	  a	  good	  essayist	  or	  a	  consumed	  debater,	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  speaking	  a	  language	  does	  not	  make	  one	  a	  novelist	  or	  a	  poet.	  It	  could	  also	  be	  argued	  that	  these	  basic	  skills	  are	  not	  even	  sufficient	  for	  modern	  citizens,	  surrounded	  by	  complex	  information	  sources	  and	  expert	  arguers.	  The	  focus	  on	  different	  levels	  of	  argumentive	  skills,	  from	  the	  simplest—giving	  an	  argument—
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to	  the	  more	  complex—building	  a	  complex	  attack	  that	  anticipates	  the	  listener’s	  rebuttals—explains	  in	  part	  the	  many	  contradictory	  results	  found	  in	  this	  literature	  (contrast	  for	  instance,	  Resnick,	  Salmon,	  Zeitz,	  Wathen,	  &	  Holowchak,	  1993	  to	  Kuhn,	  1991).	  The	  focus	  here	  is	  on	  the	  basic	  skills	  necessary	  to	  engage	  in	  an	  informal	  discussion,	  as	  it	  is	  only	  the	  mastery	  of	  these	  skills	  that	  is	  predicted	  by	  the	  argumentative	  theory.	  
4.1	  Understanding	  and	  evaluating	  arguments	  
The	  first	  important	  source	  of	  data	  is	  the	  study	  of	  parenting	  style.	  Hoffman	  suggests	  categorization	  of	  parenting	  techniques	  that	  stress	  the	  importance	  of	  reasoning,	  that	  is,	  of	  providing	  arguments	  to	  convince	  children	  that	  they	  should	  perform	  or	  not	  perform	  a	  given	  action	  (Hoffman,	  1970a,	  1970b).	  Parents	  who	  use	  reasoning	  in	  such	  a	  way	  are	  more	  “successful	  in	  promoting	  resistance	  to	  temptation,	  guilt	  over	  antisocial	  behavior,	  reparation	  after	  deviation,	  altruism,	  and	  high	  levels	  of	  moral	  reasoning”	  (Grusec	  &	  Goodnow,	  1994,	  p.	  5).	  These	  results,	  however,	  could	  still	  reflect	  a	  blind	  acceptance	  of	  arguments	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  children	  rather	  than	  critical	  evaluation.	  That	  does	  not	  seem	  to	  be	  the	  case.	  Grusec	  and	  Goodnow	  (1994)	  argued	  for	  a	  two-­‐step	  approach:	  first	  comprehension	  and	  then	  evaluation.	  Most	  relevant	  here	  is	  that	  the	  second	  step	  does	  not	  follow	  necessarily	  from	  the	  first:	  children	  can	  understand	  an	  argument	  perfectly	  well	  and	  then	  reject	  it:	  children	  can	  state	  their	  parents’	  positions	  while	  still	  holding	  on	  to	  their	  own	  views.	  
	   The	  domain	  in	  which	  the	  influence	  of	  different	  arguments	  has	  been	  the	  most	  thoroughly	  studied	  is	  that	  of	  moral	  behavior	  and	  moral	  reasoning.	  Based	  on	  Turiel’s	  classic	  distinction	  between	  the	  moral	  and	  conventional	  domains	  (Turiel,	  1983),	  Nucci	  and	  Killen	  conducted	  a	  series	  of	  studies	  testing	  children’s	  perception	  of	  the	  appropriateness	  of	  arguments	  pertaining	  to	  these	  two	  domains	  (Killen,	  1991;	  Nucci,	  1984).	  Their	  participants,	  from	  preschoolers	  to	  adolescents,	  had	  to	  rate	  the	  reactions	  of	  teachers	  as	  they	  were	  confronted	  with	  violations	  in	  the	  moral	  or	  in	  the	  conventional	  domains.	  The	  reactions	  that	  were	  ‘domain	  appropriate’	  elicited	  higher	  ratings	  from	  the	  children.	  Other	  studies	  have	  observed	  directly	  children’s	  behavior	  following	  different	  injunctions	  to	  perform	  a	  moral	  act,	  such	  as	  sharing	  toys	  or	  candies.	  It	  was	  observed	  that	  children	  do	  not	  indiscriminately	  accept	  any	  argument.	  ‘Empathic’	  arguments	  (e.g.,	  “[poor	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children]	  would	  be	  so	  happy	  and	  excited	  if	  they	  could	  buy	  food	  and	  toys…”)	  were	  much	  more	  efficient	  than	  ‘normative’	  arguments	  (“we	  should	  give	  some	  money	  to	  others	  poorer	  than	  ourselves…”)	  (Eisenberg-­‐Berg	  &	  Geisheker,	  1979).	  Moreover,	  children	  (7	  to	  10	  years	  old)	  are	  sensitive	  to	  the	  intensity	  of	  the	  feelings	  being	  described	  (Kuczynski,	  1982).	  Nine-­‐year-­‐olds	  also	  respond	  to	  arguments	  invoking	  abstract	  rules	  or	  the	  transgressor’s	  intentions	  (e.g.,	  LaVoie,	  1974).	  Interestingly,	  arguments	  are	  much	  less	  effective	  when	  they	  target	  the	  child’s	  own	  emotions,	  as	  in	  “if	  you	  share	  your	  toys,	  you	  will	  be	  very	  happy.”	  In	  that	  case,	  children	  can	  evaluate	  the	  statement—they	  know	  how	  they	  feel	  when	  they	  engage	  in	  a	  pro-­‐social	  action	  and	  realize	  that	  the	  premise	  may	  not	  be	  completely	  true	  (Kuczynski,	  1982).	  	  
Children’s	  ability	  to	  discern	  good	  arguments	  from	  poor	  ones	  is	  not	  limited	  to	  the	  domain	  of	  morality.	  Faced	  with	  standard	  conservation	  tasks,	  second	  graders	  are	  much	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  persuaded	  by	  the	  arguments	  of	  a	  conserver	  than	  by	  those	  of	  a	  non-­‐conserver	  (Miller	  &	  Brownell,	  1975).	  	  Again,	  in	  this	  case	  they	  are	  not	  simply	  following	  some	  sort	  of	  authority	  because	  the	  conservers’	  arguments	  regarding	  any	  other	  questions	  are	  not	  as	  likely	  to	  be	  persuasive.	  That	  children	  are	  selectively	  swayed	  by	  good	  arguments	  is	  also	  shown	  by	  the	  results	  from	  collaborative	  learning	  and	  reasoning	  reviewed	  in	  Section	  3.	  	  
	   Children	  and	  adolescents	  possess	  other	  valuable	  argumentive	  skills.	  	  For	  example,	  6-­‐year-­‐olds	  are	  sensitive	  to	  circular	  arguments	  (Baum,	  Danovitch,	  &	  Keil,	  2007).	  High	  school	  students	  are	  able	  to	  spot	  all	  sorts	  of	  fallacies	  (Klaczynski,	  1997;	  Neuman,	  2003;	  Neuman,	  Weinstock,	  &	  Glasner,	  2006;	  Weinstock,	  Neuman,	  &	  Tabak,	  2004).	  So	  it	  does	  seem	  that	  children,	  even	  at	  a	  very	  young	  age,	  can	  not	  only	  understand	  but	  also	  evaluate	  arguments,	  and	  that	  these	  skills	  continue	  to	  mature	  as	  children	  grow	  older.	  
4.2	  Producing	  arguments	  
There	  is	  now	  a	  wealth	  of	  data	  on	  early	  justifications,	  explanations	  and	  arguments.	  Several	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  as	  soon	  as	  toddlers	  can	  utter	  sentences,	  at	  around	  18	  or	  24	  months	  of	  age,	  they	  use	  them	  to	  justify	  their	  violations	  or	  try	  to	  argue	  with	  their	  parents	  or	  their	  siblings	  (Kuczynski	  &	  Kochanska,	  1990;	  Kuczynski,	  Kochanska,	  Radke-­‐
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Yarrow,	  &	  Girnius-­‐Brown,	  1987;	  Perlman	  &	  Ross,	  2005).	  For	  instance,	  a	  child	  could	  justify	  her	  refusal	  to	  pick	  up	  her	  toys	  by	  stating	  that	  “No.	  I	  tired,”	  or	  reclaim	  a	  toy	  from	  her	  sibling	  with	  the	  justification	  that	  “that	  doesn't	  belong	  to	  you”	  (Dunn	  &	  Munn,	  1987,	  p.	  793).	  By	  3	  years	  of	  age,	  children	  are	  able	  to	  “generate	  and	  think	  about	  positive	  and	  negative	  reasons	  for	  pursuing	  different	  courses	  of	  action	  or	  for	  holding	  specific	  sets	  of	  beliefs”	  (Stein	  &	  Bernas,	  1999,	  p.	  97).	  They	  can	  also	  have	  recourse	  in	  argumentation	  to	  social	  rules,	  to	  the	  material	  consequences	  of	  actions	  or	  the	  consequences	  for	  the	  others’	  feelings	  (Dunn	  &	  Munn,	  1987).	  In	  the	  course	  of	  making	  these	  arguments,	  children	  use	  logical	  structures	  that	  remain	  obscure,	  in	  their	  abstract	  forms,	  to	  adult	  participants	  (such	  as	  the	  modus	  tollens	  used	  by	  4-­‐year-­‐olds:	  Scholnick	  &	  Wing,	  1991).	  	  
	   Thus	  children	  can	  use	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  argumentive	  tactics	  in	  the	  course	  of	  negotiations	  or	  justifications.	  But,	  are	  the	  arguments	  they	  use	  appropriate	  and	  are	  these	  tactics	  successful?	  In	  the	  moral	  domain,	  children	  use	  different	  arguments	  depending	  on	  the	  kind	  of	  violation	  (conventional	  or	  moral)	  that	  has	  been	  committed	  (Nucci,	  1985).	  For	  instance,	  preschoolers	  do	  not	  try	  to	  challenge	  moral	  rules,	  like	  saying	  that	  stealing	  is	  right	  generally;	  instead	  they	  argue	  that	  they	  had	  been	  wronged	  by	  the	  victim	  before	  or	  that	  the	  toy	  was	  theirs	  all	  along	  (see	  Brenneis	  &	  Lein,	  1977;	  Goodwin,	  1983;	  Maynard,	  1985).	  Five-­‐year-­‐olds	  can	  also	  produce	  elaborate	  causal	  explanations	  as	  arguments	  (Orsolini,	  1993a,	  1993b;	  Orsolini	  &	  Pontecorvo,	  1992).	  These	  more	  felicitous	  or	  complex	  arguments	  tend	  to	  lead	  to	  successful	  conflict	  resolution.	  The	  better	  the	  children	  are	  at	  constructing	  arguments,	  the	  greater	  the	  likelihood	  that	  they	  will	  successfully	  put	  an	  end	  to	  a	  conflict	  (e.g.,	  Ram	  &	  Ross,	  2001).	  
	   All	  of	  these	  results	  may	  seem	  to	  be	  at	  odds	  with	  the	  message	  of	  many	  psychologists	  and	  educators	  that	  urge	  for	  more	  teaching	  of	  argumentive	  skills	  (Kuhn,	  2005;	  Perkins,	  Farady,	  &	  Bushey,	  1991).	  If	  children	  are	  naturally	  good	  at	  argumentation,	  what	  is	  left	  to	  teach?	  	  First,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  emphasize	  that	  even	  though	  argumentive	  skills	  may	  have	  an	  evolutionary	  basis,	  they	  do	  not	  emerge	  fully	  fledged.	  Some	  tactics,	  such	  as	  attacking	  a	  particular	  point	  in	  an	  interlocutor’s	  argument,	  are	  only	  common	  in	  teenagers	  (Berkowitz	  &	  Gibbs,	  1985).	  Moreover,	  as	  pointed	  out	  earlier,	  the	  basic	  argumentive	  skills	  that	  should	  develop	  mostly	  naturally	  in	  the	  course	  of	  conversations	  might	  not	  be	  deemed	  appropriate	  for	  all	  purposes.	  But	  there	  are	  also	  reasons	  why	  children	  (or	  adults)	  can	  seem	  to	  be	  less	  argumentatively	  skilled	  than	  they	  are.	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   The	  first	  factor	  that	  should	  be	  taken	  into	  account	  when	  evaluating	  spontaneous	  argumentive	  skills	  is	  that	  reasoning	  cannot	  be	  expected	  to	  find	  the	  best	  arguments	  from	  the	  start.	  According	  to	  the	  argumentative	  theory,	  reasoning	  evolved	  to	  help	  us	  find	  and	  evaluate	  reasons	  in	  argumentive	  contexts.	  These	  contexts	  have	  the	  particularity	  of	  allowing	  speakers	  to	  try	  several	  arguments	  in	  order	  to	  make	  their	  point.	  A	  failure	  at	  the	  first	  attempt	  is	  nearly	  costless:	  a	  second	  argument	  can	  always	  be	  put	  forward;	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  overshoot	  by	  finding	  a	  foolproof	  argument	  on	  the	  first	  try.	  Thus,	  reasoning	  should	  display	  a	  very	  high	  degree	  of	  satisficing:	  it	  should	  not	  look	  for	  the	  best	  arguments	  but	  for	  one	  that	  are	  good	  enough	  (Mercier,	  submitted-­‐a).	  This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  observers	  are	  often	  dispirited	  by	  the	  level	  of	  naïve	  adult	  participants’	  arguments	  (e.g.,	  Kuhn,	  1991;	  Perkins,	  1985).	  In	  most	  experimental	  settings,	  participants	  do	  not	  have	  an	  interlocutor	  who	  would	  force	  them	  to	  find	  better	  arguments	  by	  refusing	  to	  accept	  or	  rebutting	  their	  initial	  attempts.	  The	  most	  natural	  way	  to	  force	  people	  to	  construct	  better	  arguments	  is	  to	  offer	  counter-­‐arguments,	  something	  that	  happens	  spontaneously	  in	  groups	  and	  explains	  in	  part	  their	  better	  level	  of	  reasoning	  performance.	  But	  the	  quality	  of	  argument	  can	  also	  be	  improved	  by	  setting	  high	  standards	  for	  students’	  explanations	  and	  by	  asking	  them	  to	  elaborate	  on	  their	  arguments	  (Anderson,	  Chinn,	  Chang,	  Waggoner,	  &	  Yi,	  1997;	  Anderson,	  Chinn,	  Waggoner,	  &	  Nguyen,	  1998;	  Lin	  &	  Anderson,	  2008;	  Webb	  et	  al.,	  2008).	  
	   A	  related	  reason	  for	  the	  poor	  performance	  in	  standard	  tasks	  is	  the	  lack	  of	  a	  good	  motivation	  to	  argue.	  According	  to	  the	  present	  view,	  reasoning	  is	  triggered	  by	  the	  need	  to	  convince	  or	  by	  the	  evaluation	  of	  arguments	  supporting	  a	  claim	  deemed	  to	  be	  relevant.	  Appropriate	  motivation	  is	  crucial	  for	  children	  to	  deliver	  good	  arguments.	  Thus,	  Stein	  and	  her	  collaborators	  were	  able	  to	  observe	  the	  production	  of	  felicitous	  reasons	  in	  3-­‐year-­‐olds	  because	  the	  exchanges	  were	  “personally	  meaningful	  to	  young	  children	  and	  ...	  impact[ed]	  directly	  on	  their	  goals,	  beliefs,	  and	  well-­‐being”	  (Stein	  &	  Bernas,	  1999,	  p.	  97).	  All	  the	  data	  showing	  the	  production	  of	  justifications	  and	  arguments	  in	  very	  young	  children	  also	  arises	  from	  conflict	  resolution	  or	  negotiation	  situations.	  It	  should	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  when	  children	  are	  put	  in	  situations	  in	  which	  they	  may	  not	  be	  motivated	  to	  convince	  someone—when,	  for	  instance,	  they	  have	  to	  support	  a	  mathematical	  result—they	  are	  much	  less	  likely	  to	  come	  up	  with	  good	  justifications.	  But	  children,	  as	  adults,	  can	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sometimes	  be	  made	  to	  care	  about	  defending	  their	  point	  of	  view	  simply	  by	  being	  put	  in	  a	  group	  with	  people	  who	  do	  not	  share	  their	  point	  of	  view.	  
5.	  Collaborative	  learning	  and	  reasoning	  
5.1	  The	  benefits	  of	  collaborative	  reasoning	  and	  learning	  
According	  to	  the	  present	  theory,	  reasoning	  should	  be	  at	  its	  best	  in	  argumentive	  contexts.	  Such	  contexts	  naturally	  arise	  from	  a	  disagreement	  in	  a	  group	  willing	  to	  work	  together—this	  is	  the	  kind	  of	  context	  for	  which	  reasoning,	  it	  was	  suggested,	  evolved.	  Reasoning	  should	  be	  activated	  more	  easily,	  and	  should	  be	  more	  efficient	  in	  such	  contexts,	  much	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  color	  vision	  is	  at	  its	  best	  in	  broad	  daylight.	  There	  is	  now	  a	  wealth	  of	  evidence	  supporting	  this	  hypothesis.	  Indeed,	  “research	  on	  cooperative	  learning	  is	  one	  of	  the	  greatest	  success	  stories	  in	  the	  history	  of	  educational	  research”	  (Slavin,	  1996,	  p.43).	  	  
Two	  main	  traditions	  have	  shown	  that	  collaborative	  reasoning	  and	  learning	  can	  bring	  important	  cognitive	  benefits.	  The	  first	  is	  a	  neo-­‐Piagetian	  research	  program	  that	  sees	  socio-­‐cognitive	  conflict	  as	  playing	  a	  crucial	  role	  in	  the	  development	  of	  children’s	  reasoning	  abilities	  (see	  Doise	  &	  Mugny,	  1984;	  Perret-­‐Clermont,	  1980;	  Perret-­‐Clermont	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  It	  relies	  substantially	  on	  the	  following	  paradigm:	  children	  have	  to	  solve	  a	  task	  individually	  (pretest);	  they	  are	  confronted	  with	  the	  same	  task	  in	  pairs	  (test),	  before	  finally	  solving	  the	  task	  individually	  again	  (posttest).	  The	  most	  important	  parameter	  is	  the	  way	  children	  are	  paired	  with	  each	  other:	  a	  conserver	  can	  be	  paired	  with	  a	  non-­‐conserver,	  or	  a	  non-­‐conserver	  of	  a	  given	  type	  with	  a	  non-­‐conserver	  of	  another	  type.	  Children	  could	  also	  face	  an	  adult	  who	  tells	  them	  that	  they	  were	  wrong	  and	  why.	  The	  most	  relevant	  finding	  is	  that	  the	  interaction	  very	  often	  leads	  to	  an	  improvement	  in	  the	  posttest,	  compared	  to	  a	  control	  condition	  in	  which	  children	  did	  not	  interact	  with	  a	  peer.	  This	  has	  been	  observed	  for	  numerous	  conservation	  tasks	  or	  spatial	  transformation	  tasks,	  at	  early	  as	  6	  years	  of	  age	  (see	  for	  instance,	  Doise	  &	  Mugny,	  1984;	  Perret-­‐Clermont,	  1980).	  The	  benefits	  of	  collaboration	  for	  this	  kind	  of	  task	  are	  extremely	  robust.	  
	   The	  second	  tradition	  that	  has	  demonstrated	  the	  benefits	  of	  collaborative	  learning	  comes	  from	  education	  research.	  Here	  data	  is	  usually	  gathered	  through	  long-­‐term	  projects	  in	  which	  whole	  classes	  are	  compared.	  The	  learning	  outcomes	  of	  students	  that	  are	  urged	  to	  cooperate	  through	  different	  means	  are	  compared	  to	  those	  of	  a	  control	  
15	  
	  
group.	  Collaboration	  has	  been	  found	  to	  have	  positive	  effects	  on	  learning	  in	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  disciplines—from	  social	  studies	  to	  mathematics—and	  ages—from	  elementary	  school	  onwards	  (see	  the	  references	  in	  Johnson	  &	  Johnson,	  2007;	  Slavin,	  1995;	  Webb	  &	  Palinscar,	  1996).	  While,	  due	  to	  their	  scale,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  draw	  conclusions	  regarding	  the	  precise	  mechanisms	  at	  play	  during	  the	  discussions	  from	  these	  studies,	  they	  are	  invaluable	  for	  investigating	  the	  long-­‐term	  consequences	  of	  collaborative	  learning.	  	  
	   More	  recently,	  these	  two	  traditions	  have	  merged	  into	  experiments	  that	  use	  educational	  material	  (science	  problems	  for	  instance)	  while	  studying	  the	  details	  of	  the	  argumentation	  taking	  place	  within	  the	  group	  and	  their	  effect	  on	  performances	  (for	  a	  review,	  see	  Nussbaum,	  2008,).	  These	  studies	  converge	  with	  their	  predecessors	  in	  concluding	  that	  “collaborative	  student	  discourse	  (i.e.,	  reflective	  discussions	  among	  students	  about	  academic	  content)	  can	  sometimes	  promote	  deep	  and	  meaningful	  learning”	  (Nussbaum,	  2008,	  p.	  348).	  	  
5.2	  Arguing	  as	  a	  natural	  source	  of	  motivation	  
Several	  theories	  could	  account	  for	  the	  improvement	  in	  performance	  observed	  in	  group	  settings.	  In	  order	  to	  support	  a	  specifically	  argumentative	  account,	  I	  attempt	  to	  show	  that	  other	  theories	  fall	  short	  of	  explaining	  all	  the	  findings.	  Four	  alternatives	  will	  be	  distinguished:	  (i)	  Groups	  are	  simply	  one	  source	  of	  motivation,	  equivalent	  to	  other	  motivational	  factors;	  (ii)	  Groups	  have	  a	  particular	  motivational	  power	  but	  it	  applies	  not	  only	  to	  reasoning	  but	  to	  all	  skills;	  (iii)	  Group	  settings	  improve	  performance	  because	  they	  allow	  students	  to	  use	  their	  natural	  pedagogical	  abilities;	  And	  (iv),	  group	  settings	  improve	  performance	  because	  they	  provide	  the	  motivation	  and	  the	  normal	  context	  for	  the	  use	  of	  reasoning	  as	  an	  argumentative	  mechanism—the	  hypothesis	  defended	  here.	  	  
	   (i)	  The	  most	  general	  motivational	  explanation	  that	  can	  be	  formulated	  is	  that	  groups	  are	  simply	  one	  source	  of	  motivation,	  among	  many	  others.	  This	  explanation	  is	  easy	  to	  refute.	  Children	  are	  surrounded	  by	  all	  kinds	  of	  motivating	  factors:	  their	  parents,	  teachers	  and	  peers	  can	  all	  motivate	  them	  to	  perform	  well.	  Yet	  these	  motivating	  factors	  do	  not	  boost	  performance	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  group	  settings.	  	  Some	  forms	  of	  motivation,	  such	  as	  external	  rewards,	  can	  even	  have	  negative	  effects	  (Deci,	  Koestner,	  &	  Ryan,	  2001;	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Deci,	  Vallerand,	  Pelletier,	  &	  Ryan,	  1991).	  Hence,	  there	  seems	  to	  be	  something	  specific	  about	  group	  settings.	  	  
(ii)	  Even	  if	  groups	  have	  a	  particular	  motivational	  power,	  it	  could	  still	  be	  that	  this	  motivational	  power	  is	  not	  specific	  to	  reasoning.	  Groups	  could	  provide	  a	  special	  motivation	  to	  perform	  better	  in	  a	  whole	  range	  of	  tasks,	  and	  reasoning	  could	  be	  only	  one	  of	  many	  psychological	  mechanisms	  responding	  to	  this	  motivation.	  This	  explanation	  is	  hard	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  fact	  that	  groups—including	  groups	  of	  children—tend	  to	  perform	  very	  poorly	  on	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  tasks	  (for	  children,	  see	  Slavin,	  1995;	  Webb,	  1997).	  But	  the	  adverse	  effects	  of	  collective	  work	  mostly	  affect	  groups	  facing	  non-­‐intellective	  tasks—tasks	  in	  which	  argumentation	  cannot	  be	  involved:	  “peer	  collaboration	  is	  an	  effective	  learning	  environment	  for	  tasks	  that	  require	  reasoning,	  but	  not	  for	  tasks	  that	  require	  rote	  learning	  or	  copying”	  (Phelps	  &	  Damon,	  1989,	  p.	  639,	  see	  also	  Barron,	  2003,	  Schwarz	  &	  Linchevski,	  2007).	  Thus,	  it	  seems	  that	  the	  motivation	  brought	  about	  by	  group	  settings	  is	  doubly	  specific:	  it	  cannot	  easily	  be	  substituted	  for	  by	  other	  sources	  of	  motivation,	  and	  it	  does	  not	  affect	  other	  skills	  as	  it	  does	  reasoning.	  	  
(iii)	  Several	  scholars	  have	  suggested	  that	  humans	  are	  endowed	  with	  natural	  pedagogical	  skills	  (Csibra	  &	  Gergely,	  2009;	  Sterelny,	  in	  press).	  It	  is	  still	  possible	  that	  groups	  improve	  performance	  because	  they	  provide	  a	  natural	  context	  for	  the	  deployment	  of	  these	  skills.	  Several	  facts	  provide	  arguments	  contrary	  to	  this	  interpretation.	  First,	  the	  typical	  student-­‐teacher	  interaction	  should	  be	  close	  to	  a	  perfect	  learning	  context	  for	  a	  pedagogical	  device:	  a	  more	  knowledgeable	  individual	  delivers	  well	  crafted	  explanations	  to	  a	  less	  knowledgeable	  individual	  whose	  performance	  depends	  on	  this	  understanding.	  	  However,	  this	  is	  specifically	  the	  baseline	  that	  education	  researchers	  are	  trying	  to	  improve	  on.	  Even	  when	  students	  can	  teach	  other	  students	  the	  results	  are	  disappointing.	  Group	  collaboration	  in	  school	  sometimes	  fails	  to	  yield	  good	  results	  in	  posttests	  despite	  good	  test	  results,	  even	  in	  intellective	  tasks.	  This	  happens	  when	  some	  students	  are	  ‘free-­‐riding’	  during	  the	  test,	  letting	  the	  more	  competent	  students	  solve	  the	  task	  (e.g.,	  Webb,	  1993).	  This	  is	  difficult	  to	  reconcile	  with	  the	  notion	  of	  a	  natural	  propensity	  for	  pedagogy.	  In	  this	  situation,	  the	  students	  clearly	  recognize	  the	  presence	  of	  more	  competent	  and	  less	  competent	  group	  members,	  but	  they	  still	  fail	  to	  provide	  or	  to	  attend	  to	  explanations.	  A	  solution	  is	  to	  artificially	  make	  the	  result	  of	  the	  group	  dependent	  on	  the	  result	  of	  each	  of	  its	  members	  in	  the	  posttest.	  In	  fact,	  in	  group	  settings,	  the	  use	  of	  this	  method	  seems	  to	  be	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indispensable:	  “Use	  of	  group	  goals	  or	  group	  rewards	  enhances	  the	  achievement	  outcomes	  of	  cooperative	  learning	  if	  and	  only	  if	  the	  group	  rewards	  are	  based	  on	  the	  individual	  learning	  of	  all	  group	  members”	  (Slavin,	  1996,	  p.	  45,	  italics	  added).	  	  
(iv)	  Even	  if	  other	  explanations	  have	  been	  ruled	  out,	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  still	  has	  to	  account	  for	  all	  the	  aforementioned	  findings.	  In	  particular	  this	  later	  finding—that	  some	  groups	  need	  special	  rewards	  to	  perform	  well—may	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	  view	  adopted	  here:	  why	  do	  all	  groups	  settings	  not	  spontaneously	  lead	  to	  felicitous	  reasoning?	  From	  the	  present	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  use	  of	  such	  artificial	  props	  is	  made	  necessary	  by	  the	  lack	  of	  argumentive	  stake	  in	  these	  tasks.	  	  Simply	  having	  to	  reason	  in	  a	  group	  is	  not	  sufficient:	  one	  has	  to	  be	  willing	  to	  defend	  an	  opinion	  and	  this	  may	  not	  always	  be	  the	  case.	  	  It	  is	  only	  when	  students	  have	  something	  to	  argue	  for	  or	  against	  that	  they	  become	  skilled	  arguers.	  Thus,	  while	  “true	  argumentation	  on	  scientific	  issues	  is	  difficult	  to	  sustain	  and	  rarely	  occurs”	  (Schwarz	  &	  Linchevski,	  2007,	  p.	  511),	  “students	  are	  extremely	  skilful	  at	  (counter-­‐)challenging,	  conceding,	  etc.	  during	  conversation	  …	  when	  discussing	  everyday	  issues”	  (Schwarz	  &	  Glassner,	  2003,	  p.	  228.).	  According	  to	  the	  present	  theory,	  it	  is	  not	  the	  intrinsic	  difficulty	  of	  scientific	  theories	  that	  creates	  problems	  for	  students	  but	  the	  fact	  that	  students	  tend	  not	  to	  be	  strongly	  opinionated	  about	  many	  school	  topics.	  In	  line	  with	  this	  interpretation,	  one	  study	  observed	  that	  when	  elementary	  school	  students	  became	  “passionately	  engaged”	  in	  an	  otherwise	  arcane	  argument,	  they	  “used	  evidence	  in	  scholarly	  ways,	  developed	  several	  arguments,	  and	  generated	  questions	  regarding	  biological	  classification”	  (Engle	  &	  Conant,	  2002,	  p.	  399,	  for	  a	  review	  of	  similar	  studies,	  see	  Nussbaum,	  2008).	  
Another	  way	  to	  create	  an	  argumentive	  stake	  is	  to	  use	  groups	  of	  participants	  who	  tend	  to	  give	  different	  answers	  according	  to	  a	  pretest,	  and	  who	  thus	  have	  an	  opinion	  to	  defend	  against	  other	  points	  of	  view.	  Using	  Piagetian	  conservation	  tasks—in	  which	  everyone	  has	  an	  opinion	  because	  the	  tasks	  tap	  into	  common	  intuitions—as	  well	  as	  a	  variety	  of	  other	  cognitive	  problems,	  studies	  have	  shown	  that	  groups	  that	  initially	  disagree	  over	  the	  solution	  can	  achieve	  significant	  cognitive	  gain,	  both	  in	  the	  test	  and	  in	  the	  posttest,	  starting	  in	  elementary	  school	  or	  even	  kindergarten	  (see	  for	  instance,	  Buchs	  &	  Butera,	  2004;	  Doise	  &	  Mugny,	  1984).	  In	  the	  most	  dramatic	  cases,	  the	  groups,	  or	  at	  least	  some	  of	  their	  members,	  attained	  levels	  of	  performance	  exceeding	  that	  of	  the	  best	  member	  in	  the	  pretest.	  For	  instance,	  two	  non-­‐conservers	  who	  make	  different	  kinds	  of	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mistakes	  can	  achieve	  conservation	  when	  they	  have	  to	  argue	  with	  each	  other—a	  phenomenon	  known	  as	  the	  ‘two	  wrongs	  make	  a	  right’	  that	  can	  already	  occur	  with	  6-­‐year-­‐olds	  (Ames	  &	  Murray,	  1982;	  Doise	  &	  Mugny,	  1984;	  Glachan	  &	  Light,	  1982;	  Schwarz,	  Neuman,	  &	  Biezuner,	  2000).	  	  
It	  is	  interesting	  to	  notice	  that	  the	  literature	  on	  group	  reasoning	  and	  decision	  making	  shows	  overwhelming	  positive	  outcome	  with	  children	  while	  providing	  many	  negative	  results	  for	  adults.	  In	  particular	  adult	  group	  reasoning	  is	  often	  plagued	  by	  ‘groupthink’	  (Janis,	  1982)	  or	  ‘group	  polarization’	  (Sunstein,	  2002),	  which	  is	  the	  tendency	  to	  stifle	  dissenting	  voices	  and	  move	  towards	  more	  extreme	  opinions.	  Group	  polarization	  typically	  occurs	  when	  all	  group	  members	  agree	  to	  start	  with.	  They	  then	  use	  reasoning	  to	  find	  arguments	  supporting	  their	  current	  opinion,	  arguments	  that	  are	  not	  critically	  examined	  since	  everybody	  agrees	  with	  their	  conclusion	  (Mercier	  &	  Landemore,	  in	  press).	  But	  arguments	  and	  debates	  stem	  from	  disagreements:	  it	  usually	  takes	  an	  artificial	  context	  to	  make	  people	  argue	  over	  something	  they	  agree	  about.	  Adults	  are	  often	  studied	  in	  such	  artificial	  contexts,	  such	  as	  mock	  juries	  or	  other	  groups	  that	  have	  to	  justify	  their	  decision	  even	  if	  it	  is	  unanimous.	  By	  contrast,	  children	  are	  mostly	  tested	  when	  facing	  problems	  about	  which	  they	  either	  disagree	  or,	  if	  they	  agree,	  they	  may	  not	  be	  expected	  to	  provide	  justifications	  for	  their	  answers,	  and	  so	  they	  do	  not	  have	  to	  argue.	  
I	  have	  tried	  to	  show	  that	  the	  present	  theory	  is	  in	  a	  good	  position	  to	  explain	  the	  performance	  of	  groups	  as	  far	  as	  reasoning	  is	  concerned.	  It	  can	  account	  for	  group	  successes—when	  there	  is	  a	  genuine	  disagreement	  leading	  to	  a	  constructive	  discussion—and	  group	  failures—when	  there	  is	  no	  disagreement	  or	  no	  argumentive	  stakes.	  Moreover,	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  in	  a	  unique	  position	  to	  explain	  how	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  can	  be	  held	  in	  check	  by	  groups	  discussing	  together.	  
4.	  Reasoning	  biases	  
4.1	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  
The	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  one	  of	  the	  most	  robust	  and	  prevalent	  bias	  observed	  by	  psychologists	  (Nickerson,	  1998).	  Classical	  theories	  of	  reasoning	  tend	  to	  explain	  this	  bias	  away	  as	  a	  result	  of	  our	  cognitive	  limitations.	  Falsification	  would	  require	  more	  cognitive	  skill	  or	  energy	  than	  is	  usually	  available.	  The	  classical	  account,	  however,	  is	  hard	  to	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sustain	  in	  the	  face	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  showing	  that	  people	  can	  be	  very	  skilled	  falsifiers	  when	  they	  want	  to	  prove	  someone	  (or	  an	  idea)	  wrong	  (see	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press-­‐a).	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  this	  pattern	  of	  result	  is	  most	  straightforwardly	  explained	  if	  reasoning	  is	  an	  argumentative	  device.	  When	  engaged	  in	  an	  argument,	  we	  should	  mostly	  look	  for	  arguments	  that	  support	  our	  position	  or	  rebut	  that	  of	  our	  interlocutor.	  In	  this	  perspective,	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  not	  a	  flaw	  but	  an	  evolved	  feature	  of	  reasoning.	  However,	  it	  could	  be	  that	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  the	  result	  of	  learning.	  Reasoning	  could	  start	  out	  as	  a	  fairly	  objective	  mechanism	  for	  producing	  arguments	  before	  people	  understand,	  as	  they	  engage	  in	  more	  and	  more	  discussions,	  that	  providing	  arguments	  for	  the	  other	  side	  is	  not	  an	  efficient	  strategy.	  	  
	   Results	  from	  the	  developmental	  literature	  show	  that	  children	  are	  biased	  from	  the	  very	  beginning.	  Stein	  and	  Albro,	  reporting	  results	  from	  children	  as	  young	  as	  3-­‐years	  old,	  conclude	  that	  “arguers	  of	  all	  age	  levels,	  from	  preschool	  to	  adulthood,	  ...	  exhibit	  similar	  biases	  in	  their	  understanding	  and	  memory	  for	  a	  conflict,	  independent	  of	  their	  age.”	  (Stein	  &	  Albro,	  2001,	  p.130).	  Likewise,	  Ross	  and	  her	  colleagues	  note	  that	  “siblings	  between	  4	  1/2	  and	  9	  1/2	  …	  evidenced	  self-­‐serving	  biases,	  ascribing	  positive	  actions	  to	  themselves	  more	  than	  to	  their	  siblings.”	  (Ross,	  Smith,	  Spielmacher,	  &	  Recchia,	  2004,	  p.	  61).	  These	  siblings	  also	  “spontaneously	  explained	  …	  their	  negative	  actions”	  or	  excluded	  them	  from	  their	  reports	  (ibid,	  p.	  61).	  In	  another	  study	  it	  was	  found	  that	  the	  large	  majority	  of	  9-­‐year-­‐olds’	  utterances	  supported	  their	  own	  point	  of	  view	  (Pontecorvo	  &	  Girardet,	  1993).	  It	  is	  important	  to	  stress	  that	  this	  early	  emerging	  confirmation	  bias	  does	  not	  entail	  a	  lack	  of	  ability	  to	  attack	  arguments—when	  they	  are	  the	  arguments	  of	  the	  other	  party	  in	  the	  conflict	  (Howe,	  Rinaldi,	  &	  Jennings,	  2002;	  Tesla	  &	  Dunn,	  1992).	  	  
	   One	  could	  argue,	  however,	  that	  observing	  such	  biases	  in	  situations	  of	  conflict	  is	  only	  to	  be	  expected.	  But	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  also	  observed	  when	  the	  context	  would	  seem	  to	  call	  for	  a	  more	  objective	  evaluation	  of	  arguments.	  Thus,	  Garcia-­‐Mila	  and	  Anderson	  (2008)	  point	  to	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  as	  one	  of	  the	  main	  obstacle	  to	  be	  overcome	  for	  a	  successful	  science	  education,	  even	  though	  learning	  scientific	  theories	  is	  typically	  less	  emotion	  inducing.	  Again,	  this	  should	  not	  be	  interpreted	  as	  a	  lack	  of	  critical	  thinking,	  for	  students	  can	  use	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  strategies	  to	  discount	  evidence	  that	  contradicts	  their	  beliefs	  (Chinn	  &	  Brewer,	  1998).	  Klaczynski	  and	  his	  colleagues	  have	  shown	  that	  adolescents	  only	  become	  proficient	  at	  finding	  flaws	  in	  arguments	  when	  the	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conclusions	  of	  these	  arguments	  contradict	  some	  of	  their	  previously	  held	  beliefs	  (e.g.,	  Klaczynski	  &	  Lavallee,	  2005).	  	  
	   Results	  from	  the	  developmental	  literature	  confirm	  those	  obtained	  with	  adults.	  The	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  prevalent	  and	  robust.	  The	  failure	  to	  falsify	  does	  not	  result	  from	  a	  cognitive	  deficiency	  but	  rather	  from	  a	  lack	  of	  motivation,	  particularly	  when	  one	  is	  dealing	  with	  one’s	  own	  beliefs.	  This	  failure	  to	  falsify	  can	  be	  easily	  overcome	  when	  confronted	  with	  opposing	  opinions.	  	  
4.2.	  Motivated	  reasoning	  
Motivated	  reasoning	  can	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  confirmation	  bias.	  It	  occurs	  when	  we	  use	  reasoning	  not	  while	  engaged	  in	  an	  argument	  but	  in	  anticipation	  of	  a	  discussion.	  For	  instance,	  if	  we	  have	  reasons	  to	  think	  that	  one	  of	  our	  beliefs	  will	  be	  disputed,	  we	  may	  try	  to	  proactively	  find	  arguments	  in	  its	  support	  (Kunda,	  1990).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  children	  feel	  less	  pressure	  to	  justify	  their	  beliefs	  and	  their	  actions,	  they	  may	  be	  less	  affected	  by	  motivated	  reasoning.	  Still,	  when	  children	  or	  adolescents	  are	  put	  in	  situations	  that	  strongly	  favor	  the	  use	  of	  motivated	  reasoning,	  we	  should	  observe	  the	  same	  outcomes	  as	  in	  adults.	  	  
	   A	  first	  consequence	  of	  motivated	  reasoning	  is	  the	  creation	  of	  rationalizations:	  arguments	  that	  we	  use	  to	  justify	  our	  beliefs	  even	  though	  they	  have	  no	  relationship	  with	  the	  actual	  reason	  for	  which	  we	  hold	  our	  belief.	  Children	  are	  no	  less	  apt	  than	  adults	  to	  have	  recourse	  to	  rationalizations	  (see	  for	  instance,	  Karmiloff-­‐Smith,	  1992,	  p.	  81).	  Another	  consequence	  of	  motivated	  reasoning	  is	  that	  all	  the	  arguments	  gathered	  in	  preparation	  of	  a	  defense	  of	  our	  beliefs	  may	  in	  fact	  end	  up	  strengthening	  our	  beliefs	  to	  the	  point	  of	  changing	  them.	  Adolescents	  can	  see	  their	  attitudes	  polarize	  in	  this	  fashion	  (Klaczynski,	  2000).	  	  
Motivated	  reasoning	  is	  also	  at	  play	  in	  the	  moral	  domain,	  where	  it	  allows	  us	  to	  find	  excuses	  for	  behaviors	  that	  may	  violate	  our	  moral	  intuitions	  (Haidt,	  2001).	  Recent	  studies	  involving	  children’s	  moral	  decision	  making	  in	  groups	  show	  that	  moral	  reasoning	  is	  linked	  to	  persuasion	  skills	  (Gummerum	  et	  al.,	  2008;	  Takezawa	  et	  al.,	  2006).	  In	  these	  experiments,	  children	  (11	  to	  14-­‐year-­‐olds)	  had	  to	  play	  economic	  games	  (the	  ultimatum	  game	  or	  the	  dictator	  game)	  in	  groups.	  For	  instance,	  they	  might	  have	  had	  to	  decide	  how	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many	  of	  twenty	  20-­‐cents	  coins	  they	  would	  allocate	  to	  another	  group	  that	  had	  no	  opportunity	  to	  retaliate	  or	  reciprocate	  (dictator	  game).	  The	  stage	  of	  moral	  reasoning	  reached	  by	  the	  participants	  was	  later	  assessed.	  No	  correlation	  was	  observed	  between	  these	  stages	  of	  moral	  reasoning	  and	  altruistic	  behavior:	  children	  who	  had	  achieved	  a	  higher	  stage	  had	  no	  propensity	  to	  give	  more	  coins.	  However,	  the	  children	  who	  had	  higher	  scores	  of	  moral	  reasoning	  were	  better	  at	  convincing	  other	  group	  members	  to	  adopt	  their	  suggestion,	  whether	  they	  pushed	  for	  altruism	  of	  egoism.	  These	  results	  fit	  in	  well	  both	  with	  Haidt’s	  theory	  and	  with	  the	  present	  framework.	  This	  does	  not	  mean	  however	  that	  reasoning	  always	  plays	  a	  negative	  role	  in	  moral	  development.	  In	  particular,	  group	  reasoning	  can	  sometimes	  lead	  to	  superior	  moral	  outcomes	  (see	  Mercier,	  submitted-­‐b).	  
Aware	  of	  the	  pitfalls	  of	  the	  confirmation	  bias,	  many	  educators	  have	  emphasized	  the	  teaching	  of	  critical	  thinking	  skills,	  but	  they	  have	  only	  met	  with	  limited	  success	  (Ritchart	  &	  Perkins,	  2005;	  Willingham,	  2008;	  for	  a	  counterpoint	  and	  a	  recent	  exception,	  see	  Kuhn	  &	  Crowell,	  in	  press).	  This	  is	  only	  to	  be	  expected	  if	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  is	  an	  evolved	  feature	  of	  reasoning,	  as	  suggested	  by	  the	  evidence	  reviewed	  above.	  However,	  the	  current	  theory	  also	  suggests	  a	  way	  to	  hold	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  in	  check:	  group	  discussion.	  When	  children	  have	  to	  solve	  a	  task	  together,	  they	  are	  often	  able	  to	  change	  their	  mind,	  sometimes	  deriving	  a	  better	  solution	  in	  the	  process.	  In	  such	  contexts,	  the	  confirmation	  bias	  can	  become	  a	  form	  of	  division	  of	  cognitive	  labor.	  Instead	  of	  having	  to	  look	  for	  arguments	  for	  and	  against	  every	  position,	  each	  group	  member	  only	  tries	  to	  find	  arguments	  for	  his	  or	  her	  opinion	  and	  against	  that	  of	  the	  others.	  As	  long	  as	  they	  are	  able	  to	  evaluate	  others	  members’	  arguments	  and	  change	  their	  mind	  if	  necessary,	  then	  the	  outcome	  should	  be	  felicitous	  for	  a	  minimal	  cost,	  not	  despite	  but	  thanks	  to	  the	  confirmation	  bias.	  	  
4.3.	  Reasoning	  and	  decision	  making	  
Most	  dual	  process	  theories	  predict	  that	  reasoning,	  thinking	  carefully	  about	  the	  pros	  and	  cons	  of	  different	  options	  will	  lead	  to	  better	  decisions.	  	  According	  to	  the	  current	  proposal,	  when	  reasoning	  is	  used	  in	  decision	  making,	  it	  performs	  the	  same	  function	  as	  it	  does	  when	  used	  in	  its	  natural	  context:	  it	  looks	  for	  arguments.	  Accordingly,	  reasoning	  should	  lead	  towards	  decisions	  that	  are	  easier	  to	  justify—decisions	  for	  which	  arguments	  can	  be	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most	  easily	  gathered.	  An	  extensive	  literature	  in	  the	  judgment	  and	  decision	  making	  field	  supports	  this	  prediction	  (see	  Mercier	  &	  Sperber,	  in	  press-­‐a).	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  children	  are	  less	  prone	  than	  adults	  to	  reasoning	  before	  making	  a	  decision,	  the	  current	  theory	  predicts	  that	  they	  should	  be	  less	  likely	  to	  fall	  prey	  to	  the	  mistakes	  attributed	  to	  reason	  based	  choice.	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  classical	  theories	  of	  reasoning	  predict	  a	  linear	  increase	  in	  correct	  responses	  with	  the	  use	  of	  reasoning—and	  therefore	  with	  age.	  	  
	   In	  line	  with	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory,	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  that	  “children	  sometimes	  make	  better	  decisions	  and	  less	  biased	  judgments,	  and	  thus	  may	  (sometimes)	  be	  more	  rational,	  than	  adults.”	  (Klaczynski,	  2009,	  p.	  265-­‐6,	  see	  also	  Reyna	  &	  Farley,	  2006).	  At	  least	  three	  mistakes	  that	  are	  due,	  at	  least	  in	  part,	  to	  reasoning	  follow	  this	  pattern.	  The	  first	  is	  the	  sunk	  cost	  fallacy—the	  tendency	  to	  keep	  investing	  time,	  energy	  or	  money	  into	  a	  project	  because	  an	  investment	  as	  already	  been	  made.	  Experiments	  show	  an	  increase	  with	  age	  in	  the	  percentage	  of	  children	  committing	  the	  fallacy	  (Klaczynski	  &	  Cottrell,	  2004;	  Morsanyi	  &	  Handley,	  2008).	  The	  second	  phenomenon	  of	  interest	  is	  the	  attention	  paid	  to	  irrelevant	  information.	  While	  adults	  feel	  compelled	  to	  justify	  themselves	  if	  they	  do	  not	  take	  into	  account	  everything	  they	  have	  been	  told	  in	  the	  experiment,	  children	  can	  discount	  irrelevant	  information	  more	  easily,	  presumably	  because	  they	  feel	  less	  of	  a	  pressure	  to	  justify	  themselves	  (Klaczynski,	  submitted).	  Finally,	  some	  framing	  effects	  have	  also	  been	  explained	  as	  reason	  based	  choices.	  It	  should	  therefore	  come	  as	  no	  surprise	  that	  some	  experiments	  have	  unveiled	  a	  marked	  increase	  in	  framing	  effects	  with	  age	  (Reyna	  &	  Ellis,	  1994).	  




At	  least	  in	  the	  West,	  an	  individual	  view	  of	  reasoning	  has	  dominated	  philosophy	  since	  Descartes,	  and	  psychology	  at	  least	  since	  the	  cognitive	  revolution.	  The	  argumentative	  theory	  of	  reasoning	  joins	  other	  dissenting	  voices	  in	  claiming	  that	  reasoning	  is	  in	  fact	  a	  fundamentally	  social	  and,	  more	  specifically,	  argumentive	  ability.	  However,	  the	  accumulated	  support	  for	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  suffered	  from	  an	  important	  defect:	  it	  nearly	  exclusively	  drew	  on	  research	  with	  adults.	  This	  is	  problematic	  since,	  as	  an	  evolutionary	  theory,	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  needs	  to	  show	  that	  the	  feature	  of	  reasoning	  it	  predicts	  are	  not	  purely	  the	  outcome	  of	  a	  learning	  process.	  In	  this	  article,	  evidence	  has	  been	  reviewed	  supporting	  the	  following	  contentions,	  which	  are	  of	  interest	  even	  if	  one	  does	  not	  accept	  the	  theory	  they	  support:	  	  
-­‐ Children	  possess	  basic	  argumentive	  skills	  (Section	  2)	  
-­‐ Children	  spontaneously	  reason	  in	  groups	  and	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  collaborative	  reasoning	  (Section	  3)	  
-­‐ Children’s	  reasoning	  has	  a	  confirmation	  bias	  from	  the	  start	  (Section	  4.1),	  which	  explains	  the	  poor	  consequences	  of	  motivated	  reasoning	  (Section	  4.2)	  
-­‐ Because	  children	  reason	  less	  than	  adults	  in	  some	  situations,	  they	  can	  sometimes	  make	  better	  decisions	  by	  using	  reasoning	  less	  (Section	  4.3)	  	  
This	  research	  would	  benefit	  from	  being	  extended	  in	  several	  directions.	  One	  is	  the	  study	  of	  special	  populations.	  Populations	  with	  known	  deficits	  in	  social	  cognition	  would	  be	  of	  particular	  interest	  (see	  for	  instance,	  McKenzie,	  Evans,	  &	  Handley,	  2010).	  Populations	  with	  specific	  reasoning	  problems	  could	  provide	  another	  interesting	  comparison	  point	  (e.g.,	  Williams	  syndrome).	  The	  present,	  ultimate	  level	  theory	  should	  also	  interact	  constructively	  with	  proximal	  and	  developmental	  theories.	  	  
One	  of	  the	  strengths	  of	  the	  argumentative	  theory	  is	  its	  ability	  to	  explain	  broad	  trends	  observed	  in	  different	  domains.	  By	  drawing	  attention	  to	  the	  startlingly	  similar	  patterns	  of	  reasoning	  observed	  in	  children	  and	  adults,	  it	  may	  contribute	  to	  a	  further	  rapprochement	  between	  studies	  of	  these	  two	  populations.	  This	  article	  can	  also	  be	  taken	  as	  another	  plea	  to	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  reasoning	  in	  interaction,	  echoing	  the	  concerns	  of	  many	  developmental	  psychologists.	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